Le 23 mars dernier, l’Assemblée Nationale a adopté l’article 7 du projet de loi relative aux jeux olympiques, autorisant l’utilisation de la vidéosurveillance algorithmique. Une décision prise pour renforcer la sécurité de l’événement qui ne fait pas l’unanimité.
Avec des milliers d’athlètes et des millions de visiteurs venus du Monde entier, les Jeux Olympiques qui se dérouleront en France du 24 juillet au 8 septembre 2024 constituent un véritable casse-tête sécuritaire.
Pour y faire face, le gouvernement a souhaité mettre en place des capacités de surveillance supplémentaires dont ces caméras d’un nouveau type qui fonctionnent avec l’Intelligence Artificielle.
Vous avez dit intelligente ?
Déjà bien implantée dans les rues, les zones commerciales et les lieux de forte fréquentation, la vidéosurveillance fait désormais partie de notre panorama quotidien. Mais jusqu’à présent, il s’agissait d’une technologie classique fonctionnant avec des caméras analogiques placées sous le contrôle d’opérateurs humains formés à leur exploitation.
Les dispositifs mis en œuvre pour 2024 font quant à eux appel à des caméras dites « augmentées »qui analysent automatiquement les situations grâce à des algorithmes spécifiques et peuvent signaler rapidement des colis, des comportements suspects ou des mouvements de foule. Cette nouvelle vidéosurveillance, plus économe en ressources humaines (un seul agent peut gérer des dizaines, voire des centaines de caméras) permet en outre aux forces de sécurité de gagner un temps précieux entre l’identification d’une anomalie et l’intervention, notamment dans des lieux aussi animés que les transport en commun et les manifestations sportives ou culturelles. Un sérieux atout dans une période où le risque terroriste reste particulièrement élevé.
La surveillance, oui mais jusqu’où ?
Même si l’utilisation de cette technologie entre dans un cadre juridique spécifique « expérimental et temporaire » qui la limite théoriquement dans le temps (à priori jusqu’au 31 décembre 2024), elle ne suscite pas moins des inquiétudes, notamment chez certains élus et du côté de la CNIL (Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés) .Ils craignent que le déploiement de ces technologies puisse dériver vers une surveillance de masse permanente et l’ identification biométrique des individus par reconnaissance faciale. Face à un système algorithmique entièrement automatisé, on peut aussi redouter des interprétations erronées de gestes ou d’attitudes émanant d’un individu ou d’un groupe d’individus. En clair, quelles seraient les conséquences si la machine se trompait ?
A l’heure ou l’IA et l’apparition d’algorithmes de plus en plus sophistiqués comme Chat GPT font l’objet de nombreux débats pour en assurer l’encadrement à la fois déontologique et législatif dans le respect des droits fondamentaux, les interrogations sur l’emploi de la vidéosurveillance augmentée risquent fort de se multiplier.
Surreptitious intrusion consists of opening and subsequently closing a locked premises in the absence of a key. The forced entry is effected by means of one or more specific instrument(s), and will not necessarily damage the lock. Only a specialized examination can establish whether such an opening actually occurred and how it was performed. The expert must have an exact knowledge of how the various families of locks operate, be proficient in all possible methods of forced entry — destructive or non-destructive — and understand the physical and mechanical principles involved.
Although this field is relatively little known, surreptitious intrusion — namely the opening and closing of a locked premises without a key — is nonetheless defined by the legislator.
The French Penal Code indeed recalls, in its article 311-5, paragraph 3, concerning aggravated theft, that one of the following circumstances is established: “3° When it is committed in premises … by entering the premises by guile, forced entry or climbing.”
“Breaking and entering” is defined in Article 132-73 of the Penal Code1 as follows: “Breaking and entering consists of the forcing, damaging or destruction of any locking device or any type of enclosure. Also assimilated to forced entry is the use of false keys, unlawfully obtained keys, or any instrument that may be fraudulently employed to operate a locking device without forcing or damaging it.”
Thus, the legislator:
• Acknowledges the possibility that a locked device may be opened without its legitimate key and without damage;
• Considers this modus operandi as an aggravating circumstance;
• Assimilates this modus operandi to “classical” breaking and entering (involving breakage).
Whether in the context of criminal law or in relation to insurance (for which theft “without forcible entry” is often a standard exclusion clause), it is essential to be able to determine the reality of such a burglary.
How can it be determined?
Forcible entry carried out using one or more specific instrument(s) will not necessarily damage the lock. This type of opening—by its nature non-destructive—remains fraudulent and therefore punishable under the law. But how can one know whether such an opening actually took place, and by what means? Only a specialised forensic examination can provide answers to these questions.
Moreover, what is the factual reality of these practices?
A staple of action films, is opening a door without force or damage truly possible? Beyond the simple credit card slipped between the doorjamb and the door (the ‘classic’ unlocking method that anyone who has ever accidentally shut their door with the keys inside has in mind), is this type of opening actually feasible in practice? Is it possible to unlock a door with a five-point locking system—or even an armoured door—without leaving obvious traces?
In this article, we will focus on presenting the ‘invisible’ extent of so-called “subtle” break-ins, and on the expert work that can be carried out to “make locks speak”.
Is a non-destructive, trace-free “subtle” forcible entry possible? And if so, how does it work?
It is commonly accepted that to open a “real” lock (i.e., other than very basic locks) without using the legitimate key, one must either break the key itself or break the element to which the lock is attached, or one of the components that secure the assembly (door, frame and bolt). Yet it is possible to target the lock mechanism itself and thereby operate it “as if the legitimate key were present,” without actually inserting that key.
During a “lock-picking” for example (one of the “soft” techniques among more than a dozen others), the lock can be made to “turn” without the key inside. It then becomes possible to unlock the door. One can even relock it easily without having to pick the lock again. After the opening and subsequent closing of the lock, no trace is visible from the outside and the lock continues to function as before.
Which locks and, more broadly, which security systems are concerned by these “risks”?
The better conceived a system is, the harder it will be to find a way around it. But every system has weaknesses. With the necessary knowledge and sufficient time, it will always be possible to bypass it. From a security standpoint (for readers who may begin to worry about the effective protection of their front door), combining multiple systems and installing them thoughtfully will provide a satisfactory level of security. Nevertheless, each system taken individually remains susceptible to circumvention. Therefore all types of locks are potentially exposed to this risk and may warrant expert analysis when in doubt.
Are these techniques actually used, by whom and in what circumstances?
In the majority of cases — opportunistic burglaries, offences that already produce abundant traces, etc. — the perpetrator(s) will not necessarily possess the skills required to conduct the intrusive part of their crime stealthily. The use of a crowbar allows much faster execution and, provided that the traces left at the scene do not seriously bother them, offenders often make no effort to conceal their tracks.
Nevertheless, covert intrusion methods may be employed in specific cases where the offenders attempt to minimise any sign of their presence (homicides, thefts of sensitive information, disguised thefts, etc.). The appeal of these techniques is real. Numerous online videos present the various lock bypass methods in tutorial form. Likewise, many specialist shops offer the tools necessary to implement these techniques.
It is unfortunate to note that some manufacturers do not restrict sales of such equipment to law enforcement or licensed locksmiths. Moreover, locksmiths themselves seldom use many of these soft techniques because they are costly in terms of training time and equipment and offer little commercial advantage; they often prefer the simple expedient of drilling. While most of these online tutorials are produced by and aimed at enthusiast pickers, they nevertheless put techniques within the reach of all — and therefore also within reach of persons of dubious intent.
Field observations confirm this: an increasing number of offenders specialise in one or another soft-opening technique, according to their preference for a particular offense. During judicial police operations such as searches, investigators may discover items that appear to be intrusion tools. In those circumstances we are regularly asked to determine whether the items are indeed intrusion equipment and whether they can actually function. Precise identification of these tools can thus direct investigators toward a particular modus operandi or toward a specific vehicle make (when the tools are dedicated to opening vehicles), thereby contributing to the establishment of the truth.
What do the used tools look like?
It depends on the targeted lock type. Some tools are general-purpose and cover a broad range of locks. Others are highly specialised: designed for a single type and model of lock, they are devastatingly effective in the hands of someone who knows how to use them.
When conducting an examination of toolmarks to provide real added value to an investigation, it is also important to distinguish between commercial/manufactured tools — which can be obtained more or less easily from specialist suppliers — and homemade tools that some individuals fabricate themselves (which attest to a degree of know-how and can sometimes indicate their maker). One must also mention the existence of ‘decoy’ or ‘dummy’ tools that may have left traces or be found at the scene, yet are incapable of actually opening the lock in question.
Indeed, some persons may wish to create the appearance of an intrusion (which did not in fact occur, or did not occur in the way suggested). They employ all manner of instruments — possibly leaving few traces to support the narrative of a lock being ‘picked’. Once again, the expert’s task is to determine whether the traces are consistent with the use of a tool that could actually have unlocked the device.”
What traces can be visible following an intrusion?
Non-destructive opening techniques leave micro-traces. Those traces are fundamentally different from the impressions normally produced by a legitimate key in its lock, for a variety of reasons. Examples include:
• The shape and thickness of the tools, which differ completely from those of a key and therefore imprint the surfaces they contact in a different manner.
• When a key is inserted, its rotational movement occurs after a straight, tension-free insertion, so this passage does not excessively stress the lock’s various locking elements. This is not the case during lock-picking, where pronounced pressures or ‘micro-forcings’ must be applied to engage the lock’s security components (the elements that secure it).
• Certain areas inside a lock are never in contact with the key and should therefore show no traces other than original machining. During lock-picking, tools may scrape these locations — presumed pristine — leaving significant and diagnostic traces.
Accordingly, if one knows where and what to look for, it is not only possible to detect that tools have been used, but also to identify with precision the type of attack (including so-called “non-destructive” attacks) the lock has sustained. For example, when using a technique known as ‘bumping’, the tool strikes — sometimes repeatedly — the lock’s pins, producing the characteristic traces illustrated in photo No. 7 below. Traces generated in this way are distinctive of that kind of attack. Demonstrating them can be of great value to the investigation and also helps to profile the “intrusive” methods of the offender.
On what knowledge does the expert rely to identify non-destructive forcible entry?
To examine locks and demonstrate the presence or absence of signs of forced entry, it is essential that the forensic expert have an intimate knowledge of the operating principles of the different families of locks, mastery of the full range of possible forced-entry methods (destructive and non-destructive), and a solid grasp of the physical and mechanical principles at play. The expert must possess in-depth familiarity with existing intrusion tools — including improvised implements — have extensively studied the traces and micro-traces produced by these openings, and know how to disassemble a lock cleanly while absolutely avoiding any contamination that would introduce additional traces. Finally, the expert must be aware of the techniques offenders may use to minimise traces, so as to detect them and determine whether they have been applied.
Searching for traces without knowing what to look for is obviously of little value. In some cases, a lock may display suspicious traces that do not, in fact, result from an intrusion. Such “false positives”2 can be numerous for anyone who lacks real expertise in the discipline.
For these reasons it is imperative, before searching for traces, to identify which technique may have been used and to assess the feasibility of that attack in light of the lock’s environmental context and any associated security elements. Lastly, the expert must be able to put themself in the intruder’s position — that is, be competent to perform these opening methods personally, and even to devise new ones when an innovative modus operandi is suspected. Only an expert capable of thinking like an intruder can truly understand what has been done to a lock. Micro-traces ‘speak’, but the expert must be fluent in the ‘language’ of locks in order to interpret them.
What are the steps of an intrusion expertise ?
A sound forensic examination is difficult to carry out without a proper collection. For this reason it is ideal that the expert collect the lock(s) themselves at the scene. They will take the necessary precautions and fully account for the surrounding environment. When this is not possible, it is preferable that a member of the technical-scientific police (a forensic identification technician or equivalent), who has previously received specific briefing on the subject, perform the collection.
Photo 8: Specialized tool dedicated to vehicle locks for a specific profile (HU66, for Audi, SEAT, Škoda, Volkswagen, etc.) shown inside a transparent demonstration lock
Thus, during collection, the examiner will ensure that nothing is introduced into the lock — or, if removal of the cylinder requires it, that any intervention is carried out following procedures that maximise preservation of potential traces (notably by avoiding contact with the exterior side). They will know which contextual photographs to take so that the expert can situate the lock within its original environment. Likewise, they will ask the proper questions to the lock users. The examination then continues in the laboratory. Preliminary observations are performed and the lock is prepared for analysis. The various components are disassembled, allowing non-destructive observations to be made. The true security level of the lock is assessed and any suspicious traces are sought.
“It is imperative, before searching for traces, to know which technique may have been used and to reconcile the feasibility of an attack with the actual environmental reality of the lock.”
David ELKOUBI
When it is necessary to open the examined item by sectioning and when that is judged the most appropriate course to complete the examination (for example to observe the interior of a cylinder in a location inaccessible without cutting), the sectioning is performed in such a way that it cannot in any way alter the areas of interest to be observed.
Comparisons are made between the examined item and a neutral reference component (often the exterior side of the lock compared with the interior side). Further comparisons are carried out between the traces found and sample toolmarks that may correspond. Finally, a feasibility test is undertaken when material conditions allow. At the end of all these tests, all components are again protected and resealed in order to permit any further observations later if necessary or if those observations need to be disclosed.
How to present a report in an unfamiliar field?
Beyond helping the judge to decide by giving a technical opinion, the expert’s role is to provide magistrates, lawyers and parties with a clear understanding of the technical matter for which the expert was engaged, and to explain the reasoning process that leads him to express such an opinion.
One of the difficulties in this discipline lies in translating sensitive — sometimes even secret — techniques into plain language. These techniques, which an intruder may use, are not readily understood at first glance by a lay reader. For this reason the report details the observations and their implications, explaining how the lock functions under the relevant conditions. A glossary of all technical terms used is appended to the report to render complex terminology simple and comprehensible. Educational clarity is therefore essential so that readers of the report, even without prior knowledge in the field, can grasp the reported observations and their significance.
False positives in intrusion detection
A lock can remain mounted on the same door for decades. Over that period it may undergo many incidents: insertion of a key that was not intended for it, an unsuccessful forcing attempt, deliberate or accidental insertion of foreign objects (for example by children), and so on. In such situations traces may appear on or in the lock. However, those traces do not necessarily indicate an intrusion. The only way to determine whether a trace is truly the consequence of an intrusion is to have a full understanding of the mechanisms of lock-picking and other bypass techniques.
Illustrated beside this text is an example of a pin showing unusual “traces” that are not the result of lock-picking but rather of repeated use of a copied key made from a slightly different blank profile, with a displaced stop. A naïve observation could therefore have led to a false positive (an erroneous conclusion that an intrusion had occurred, when the traces have a different origin).
NOTES :
1 : Concerning the definition of certain circumstances that aggravate, mitigate or exempt penalties. 2 : See the subsection on “false positives for intrusion”.
Widely used by law enforcement agencies worldwide for personal identification, fingerprints can also serve as a basis to carry out various screening tests.
Interest in fingerprints has recently been reignited thanks to a new study published on February 1, 2023, by researchers at the Jasmine Breast Unit of Doncaster Royal Infirmary in the United Kingdom. The scientists have developed a digital technique capable of detecting breast cancer with an accuracy of nearly 98%.
Secretions that reveal the disease…
In this case, the focus is not on analyzing fingerprint pattern classes or minutiae—the characteristic points located along the ridge lines that allow for reliable personal identification. Instead, by taking swabs from the fingertips to collect sweat, physicians were able to detect the presence of proteins and peptides identified as biomarkers of potential breast cancer.
This non-invasive, painless technique for patients could make it possible to distinguish between benign, early-stage, or metastatic tumors. If the results are confirmed, it may soon be commercialized in the form of a kit, providing a rapid and reliable diagnostic tool that is significantly less traumatic and less costly than mammography, which remains the current gold standard in breast cancer screening.
…And also detect narcotics!
From medicine to forensic science, there is often only a small step—and in this case, technology has taken it. Sweat sampling from fingerprints is already among the available methods to detect the presence of four classes of narcotics: amphetamines, cannabis, cocaine, and opiates.
Here again, it is the sweat that reveals the presence of these molecules, whether the substance was merely handled or actually ingested. The procedure requires nothing more than pressing the fingertips onto a special piece of paper and then analyzing it using mass spectrometry, which can detect the substance up to 48 hours after contact or ingestion.
Unlike blood tests, which require significant logistics, this analytical method takes only a few minutes and can also be applied to latent fingerprint residues collected at a crime scene. It has also proven effective in the medico-legal context, using post-mortem sweat samples.
TRACIP, a specialist in digital forensics, has developed several mobile laboratories to enable law enforcement to conduct investigations as close to the field as possible. Among these laboratories, the mobil’IT is an exclusive model that allows digital forensic investigators to perform forensic analyses and data recovery in an autonomous, mobile, and collaborative mode.
The Challenge of Mobility in Investigations
Investigators face multiple challenges in the course of their work, particularly the need to accelerate investigations. Shortening delays and minimizing handling steps to preserve digital evidence—given its inherent « fragility »—is a growing concern. Solutions that make it possible to deploy evidence processing and analysis tools directly at the intervention scene provide a strong response to these challenges. Since 2014, Tracip (a Deveryware entity belonging to Flandrin Technologies, the cyber division of the ChapsVision group), the first French private laboratory specializing in digital forensic expertise, has developed the mobil’IT dedicated to digital investigations. Designed to support investigators during their interventions, this laboratory takes the form of a vehicle containing all the equipment necessary to conduct on-site digital investigations.
Offering the Same Qualities as a Fixed Laboratory
The mobil’IT, a highly equipped vehicle, has been designed to maximize the use of its equipment and streamline workflows in a mobile context. It offers the same functionalities as a fixed, “traditional” laboratory while being fully autonomous. The information system plays a central role here: it acts as the nerve center, enabling investigative teams to carry out their missions without constraints while staying connected to the outside world through both traditional communication channels (4G, satellite, etc.) and dedicated ones (encrypted private networks). The internal network distribution works just like in any other laboratory, whether copper- or fiber-based. In addition, it has its own built-in resources for full autonomy, including multiple servers. Its configuration also makes it possible to access the contents of flash memories and defective or damaged hard drives.
With autonomous power supply, dedicated equipment (IT racks, workstations, cleanroom), communication systems, and more, the configuration provides flexibility and efficiency to support case resolution.
The mobil’IT’s equipment enables fully autonomous digital investigations
The specificity of digital evidence
Today, investigators face increasing difficulty in quickly and effectively synthesizing large volumes of information. Analytical tools and methods continue to evolve in order to process and exploit ever-growing amounts of data and to highlight the most relevant elements as rapidly as possible. In an increasingly digital world, accessing evidence requires the implementation of rigorous collection techniques that can withstand legal scrutiny.
Digital forensics allows investigators to transform traces into admissible digital evidence, ensuring its use in judicial proceedings. With the rise of cloud computing, the growing diversity and volume of data, and crimes that have become highly technical in nature (network breaches, cybersecurity, etc.), digital forensics is forced to adapt. Reliability of results is essential, as well as processing speed—especially when deadlines are short. For example, when a suspect is in custody, investigators have very limited time. In the case of a disappearance, every minute counts.
The central challenge of digital forensics is therefore to ensure the preservation of evidence and to prevent the alteration or falsification of identifying data (author, timestamp, device), in order to demonstrate the origin and integrity of digital documents. Otherwise, such evidence will not be admissible in court.
The collection, analysis, and reporting of digital evidence during a « field » operation requires heightened vigilance in handling the data. In a mobile context, digital evidence is even more fragile, volatile, and difficult to locate. The mobil’IT was specifically designed to address this challenge.
Mobile forensic laboratories: TRACIP’s expertise
TRACIP has developed unique expertise in mobile digital forensics, offering both deployable laboratories and portable on-site investigation kits (notably the Field k’IT backpack, a backpack including a hexib’IT laptop, an external blocker, and a duplicator).
In terms of mobile laboratories, TRACIP worked jointly with the IRCGN (French Gendarmerie Criminal Research Institute) to develop the mobil’DNA, a mobile laboratory dedicated to rapid DNA analysis for human identification. This deployable system is unmatched worldwide, enabling rapid genetic testing of large numbers of biological samples for the identification of multiple victims, whether in cases of terrorism, accidents, or natural disasters. In July 2022, the Crisis and Support Centre of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs delivered a mobil’DNA / Lab’ADN unit to the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine. This initiative formed part of France’s support to Ukrainian authorities in identifying victims of Russia’s aggression.
Rapid DNA analysis
Unlike conventional DNA analysis processes, the mobil’DNA can deliver genetic profiles for the first 21 samples within just two hours—including startup and calibration phases. After that, 21 new analysis results are generated every 30 minutes. This performance is based on a patented innovation by the IRCGN: the GendSAG (Gendarmerie Sample And Go), a new-generation swab containing a biological reactor that eliminates the extraction step. Its microfibers are designed to capture biological traces with great precision, minimizing their degradation and making DNA immediately available for PCR amplification and genotyping through capillary electrophoresis sequencing.
The mobil’DNA delivered to Ukraine in July 2022 – Credit: Jonathan Sarago – MEAE
Fully energy-autonomous, the mobil’DNA is capable of genetically analyzing up to 200 biological samples per day. It carries an entire workflow on board, from sampling to results. In addition, the analysis equipment can be deployed by air transport if needed. This device has been field-tested on multiple occasions, notably during Storm Alex (Alpes-Maritimes – 2020), the Nice attack (2016), and the Germanwings plane crash (Southern Alps – 2015).
Pour dessiner le portrait-robot d’un suspect, on avait coutume de faire appel à un portraitiste et à des logiciels spécialisés. Désormais, la police scientifique utilise aussi l’ADN récupérée sur la scène de crime pour dresser un profil physique très proche de la réalité.
En 1982, Edward Crabe, un australien de 57 ans, est assassiné dans sa chambre d’hôtel de Gold Coast situé dans l’état du Queensland. Malgré les nombreux témoignages recueillis et le prélèvement d’échantillons de sang sur la scène de crime, les enquêteurs ne réussissent pas à retrouver le coupable. 40 ans plus tard, la police australienne relance ce « cold case » en faisant appel au phénotypage de l’ADN. Cette technique encore récente, pratiquée notamment dans le laboratoire d’hématologie médico-légal de Bordeaux, permet de créer à partir de quelques cellules sanguines, le portrait-robot d’un suspect susceptible d’être identifié par les témoins ou l’entourage.
Même inconnu, l’ADN parle !
C’est en tout cas ce qu’espèrent les policiers du Queensland qui ont lancé un nouvel appel à témoins le 9 novembre 2022. Ils comptent ainsi résoudre l’assassinat d’Edward Crabe grâce au portrait-robot établi à partir du sang retrouvé dans la chambre de la victime. Un premier profil ADN avait déjà été établi en 2020 mais celui-ci n’étant pas enregistré dans les bases de données nationales, les enquêteurs s’étaient rapidement retrouvés dans une impasse. Or, l’immense avantage du phénotypage, c’est que même lorsqu’un ADN n’est fiché nulle part, il n’en constitue pas moins une mine de renseignements sur la personne correspondante.
En quoi consiste cette technique ? On sait aujourd’hui que le matériel génétique renferme de très nombreuses informations, notamment sur le sexe, l’origine ethnique, la santé et l’apparence physique d’un individu. Les récentes techniques de séquençage de l’ADN permettent désormais d’analyser les séquences génétiques dites « codantes » et d’isoler celles qui renferment les indications morphologiques. Les scientifiques peuvent ainsi déterminer de façon suffisamment précise la forme d’un visage, la couleur de la peau, des yeux et des cheveux, une prédisposition à la calvitie ou encore la présence de taches de rousseur. A partir de ce profil génétique, il est possible d’établir un profil physique qui n’est à l’heure actuelle, ni complet, ni parfait mais qui peut permettre de réveiller les souvenirs de potentiels témoins.
Une technique qui tend à se perfectionner
Il existe aujourd’hui dans le Monde plusieurs équipes de chercheurs qui travaillent à perfectionner l’analyse de ces séquences génétiques liées au phénotype. L’objectif ? Aller toujours plus loin dans la recherche des caractéristiques physiques des individus en prédisant par exemple la forme du lobe des oreilles ou encore l’âge de la personne étant à l’origine de la trace relevée.
Tous ces renseignements servent ensuite à mettre au point des programmes statistiques capables d’élaborer un portrait-robot génétique le plus proche possible de la réalité. Ces programmes, qui existent déjà aux États Unis, sont nourris par les entreprises proposant aux particuliers des tests ADN pour connaître leur généalogie et qui collaborent également avec les forces de l’ordre.
Dernièrement, une étude sur les sosies réalisée par une équipe de chercheurs du Leukaemia Research Institute à Barcelone (Espagne), est venue renforcer la réalité de ce portrait physique littéralement inscrit dans les gènes. En analysant l’ADN de ces « jumeaux virtuels », les scientifiques ont identifié des caractéristiques génétiques communes qui ne s’arrêtent d’ailleurs pas à une apparence physique similaire. Elles sont également capables d’influencer certains comportements en matière d’alimentation et même d’éducation. Des résultats qui selon l’auteure principale de l’étude, Manel Esteller « auront des implications futures en médecine légale – reconstruire le visage du criminel à partir de l’ADN – et en diagnostic génétique – la photo du visage du patient donnera déjà des indices sur le génome qu’il possède. Grâce à des efforts de collaboration, le défi ultime serait de prédire lastructure du visage d’une personne à partir de son paysage multiomique“ .
Exemple de portraits-robot génétique édités par Snapshot DNA analysis
Le projet européen VISAGE
L’objectif global du projet européen VISAGE (VISible Attributes Through GEnomics) est d’élargir l’utilisation judiciaire de l’ADN vers la construction de portraits-robot d’auteurs inconnus à partir de traces ADN le plus rapidement possible dans les cadres juridiques actuels et les lignes directrices éthiques.
Le consortium VISAGE est composé de 13 partenaires issus d’institutions universitaires, policières et judiciaires de 8 pays européens, et réunit des chercheurs en génétique légale et des praticiens en ADN judiciaire, des généticiens statistiques et des spécialistes en sciences sociales. Les objectifs sont :
d’établir de nouvelles connaissances scientifiques dans le domaine du phénotypage de l’ADN,
d’élaborer et valider de nouveaux outils dans l’analyse de l’ADN et l’interprétation statistique,
de valider et mettre en œuvre ces outils dans la pratique judiciaire,
d’étudier les dimensions éthiques, sociétales et réglementaires,
de diffuser largement les résultats et sensibiliser les différents protagonistes concernant la prédiction de l’apparence, de l’âge et de l’ascendance bio-géographique d’une personne à partir de traces d’ADN,
d’aider la justice à trouver des auteurs inconnus d’actes criminels au moyen du profilage de l’ADN
The Earth is home to eight billion people, and each of them is unique. This individuality has long been harnessed in identification processes—through genetics, fingerprint analysis, and, in the near future, brain fingerprinting.
If the 20th century was marked by technological progress, the 21st will undoubtedly be the century of neuroscience. Thanks to new fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) techniques, it is now possible to capture the “fingerprint” of a brain in less than two minutes—an imprint just as unique as those found at the tips of our fingers, enabling the identification of an individual with an accuracy approaching 100%.
A unique brain fingerprint
Beyond overall brain volume and cortical thickness, the research team at the University of Zurich working on this question has identified anatomical features that are specific to each brain, particularly in the organization of gyri and sulci—patterns that strongly resemble fingerprint ridges. This cerebral “architecture” is shaped not only by genetics but also by the practice of certain activities, life events (such as physical trauma), and the wide range of experiences that a person may undergo throughout their lifetime.
However, it is not so much the image of the brain as its neuronal activity that defines this brain fingerprint. The signals captured by fMRI are synthesized to generate a map of neural networks known as the functional brain connectome. By analyzing this connectome, researchers can create a visual summary in the form of a graph that allows them to track brain activity, identify which regions are engaged (whether sensory or cognitive), and—most importantly for identification purposes—distinguish one individual from another.
Brain fingerprinting in biometrics
Since MRI scans are still time-consuming and expensive procedures, it is unlikely that this identification method will replace fingerprint scanners in the near future.
Nevertheless, government institutions and certain private companies operating in sensitive sectors are showing strong interest in developing biometric technologies based on the identification of brain signals, which could provide advanced security for digital identities.
From smartphones to high-security facilities, systems equipped with fingerprint readers are already in widespread use, but experience has shown that such methods can be falsified. Brain fingerprinting, on the other hand, is essentially tamper-proof, as it relies on a technology driven by a specific and complex algorithm. To implement this form of cerebral biometrics, scientists use an EEG headset (electroencephalography) to record brainwaves generated in response to various sensory stimuli—such as infrequent words, black-and-white or colored images. These responses, which differ from one person to another, constitute an inviolable identity encoded within the brain. Moreover, this profile would be disrupted if the individual were subjected to coercion or violence. Thus, brain fingerprinting could emerge as a biometric technique superior to existing methods, even surpassing retinal scanning, often considered one of the most sophisticated techniques, and opening the door to new applications in forensic science..
All firearms are traceable by police forces around the world thanks to their manufacturing characteristics and their serial numbers. All of them—except for weapons manufactured with a 3D printer, which have appeared in several European countries in recent years.
In 2013, Cody Wilson, a law student at the University of Texas, founded the company Defense Distributed with the aim of developing and distributing 3D-printed firearms. When he published his first free CAD (computer-aided design) file to manufacture a plastic pistol called the Liberator, the response was immediate: no fewer than 100,000 downloads in just two days.
The event did not go unnoticed by the U.S. government, which demanded the file to be removed. That marked the start of a legal battle that culminated in 2018 with the Trump administration’s move effectively legalizing 3D-printed firearms. That decision, blocked in 2019 by a federal judge, was promptly countered by the pro-gun activist network Deterrence Dispensed, which continued to distribute firearm design files invoking the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” These ghost guns now proliferate in American cities, raising growing concern throughout North America.
UNIDENTIFIABLE AND UNTRACEABLE
Although completely illegal in Europe, these manufacturing files nonetheless circulate on the internet. According to the European police agency EUROPOL, seizures of 3D-printed weapons in the course of investigations on European territory have steadily increased in recent years. Evidence of this includes the dismantling of a workshop dedicated to their production in Spain and the arrest in the United Kingdom of individuals linked to far-right circles who were in possession of components for 3D-printed weapons.
If ghost guns worry authorities on both sides of the Atlantic, it is primarily because they evade any possibility of identification. Every firearm manufactured through an industrial process bears characteristic marks left on its various components (firing pin, ejector, barrel, etc.), as well as on cartridge cases and projectiles, producing a kind of fingerprint unique in the same way as a fingerprint. In most cases, current investigative techniques are also able to recover a serial number even when it has been deliberately obliterated. By contrast, a weapon produced by a 3D printer lacks all of these elements that would allow investigators to trace its origin or to count how many are in circulation.
Another cause for concern is the materials that make up this new generation of weapons. They are generally thermoplastics such as PLA (polylactic acid), derived from renewable resources, or ABS (acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene), a thermoplastic polymer widely used in household appliances. In both cases, the pistol will not trigger walk-through metal detectors, rendering security measures in public places ineffective—particularly against terrorist attempts. It is all the more undetectable because it can be disassembled piece by piece and then reassembled by hand in a few minutes.
A MAJOR CHALLENGE POSED BY TECHNOLOGY
The only reassuring point in the face of this new threat is the many fragilities of these ghost guns. The manufacturing process with current printers is complex, and the thermoplastics used tend either to deform, crack or break. Confronted with the explosive force of a gunshot, the structure does not hold: tests have shown that the user can usually fire only a single round before one of the weapon’s components fails catastrophically. There are 3D-printed metal gun models, but they are very expensive and thereby lose their “invisibility.”
For experts, however, it is the next development that should be kept in mind. With 3D technologies evolving constantly and very rapidly, one should expect a new generation of printers and higher-performance materials to emerge in the near future, which could then make producing a weapon as simple as child’s play.
While dental analysis has become an established technique in forensic identification, the reliability of bite mark analysis is now under scrutinity due to the lack of sufficient scientific grounding.
Like DNA or fingerprints, teeth and jaws constitute a unique “identity card” for each individual. This observation gave rise to a distinct branch of forensic medicine—forensic odontology—which found one of its earliest applications in 1897, during the Bazar de la Charité fire in Paris. Faced with completely charred and unrecognizable bodies, the authorities decided to call upon the victims’ dentists.
When teeth leave their marks
Since then, this method of identification has been systematically employed whenever human remains must be identified, whether individually or in mass disaster situations, regardless of the circumstances of death. Dental structures are highly resistant to nearly all destructive factors, including burial, cremation, immersion, and even physico-chemical assaults.
In the absence of other data, a forensic odontologist’s examination of teeth—considering pathologies and tooth wear patterns in particular—can provide valuable information on sex, age, ethnicity, and dietary habits. By comparison with ante-mortem dental records, such analyses can formally establish an individual’s identity.
Another area of forensic odontology involves the interpretation of bite marks found on victims—whether living or deceased—as well as on perpetrators or even on certain objects. Today, experts conduct these analyses using digital technologies such as 3D laser scanning, which may lead either to the identification or, conversely, to the exclusion of a potential assailant. However, since there is no standardized or automated methodology and interpretation must take into account numerous factors beyond dental patterns, some specialists argue that this forensic technique lacks sufficient scientific grounding and cannot be considered conclusive evidence.
Reliability under scrutiny
The controversy, which began in the United States in 2009 with a study published by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, has recently resurfaced following a draft report issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), questioning the scientific rigor of such analyses.
According to NIST, the interpretation of bite marks relies on two fundamental assumptions: first, that dental impressions are unique; second, that bite marks remain perfectly preserved regardless of the medium. In reality, they often involve only part of the dentition (primarily the anterior teeth). Moreover, human skin—the most common substrate for such marks—is by nature a pliable tissue, subject to distortion depending on its elasticity, the victim’s movements, the development of bruising, and the degree of healing at the site. All these factors, experts argue, undermine the reliability of bite mark comparison as a means of incriminating a suspect.Although this federal agency’s report is still in draft form, its preliminary findings are already stirring significant debate within the scientific community and among advocacy organizations working to prove the innocence of individuals wrongfully convicted. One such organization, the Innocence Project, based in the United States, has highlighted that 26 people were wrongfully convicted on the basis of bite mark evidence—an alarming fact that foreshadows numerous legal battles to come
The fight against all forms of sexual violence and assault is a constant concern of the Gendarmerie units, which work daily in the field in partnership with all institutional and non-governmental stakeholders involved in addressing this phenomenon.
While improving the training of military personnel and strengthening prevention of such cases are essential approaches to optimizing the current system, the judicial phase remains crucial to identify perpetrators and bring them before the courts.
Victims of sexual assault may either report to an investigative unit, go to a hospital (Emergency Department or Sexual Violence Unit), or contact an association whose mission is to support victims of such offenses.
In the first case, this results in the filing of a formal complaint. In hospital settings or through an association, at the very least an official report is made. If the assault occurred within the previous five days, the victim enters a pathway that includes reception and support, anamnesis, forensic sampling, and traceability. Beyond five days, the victim is directed to information and medico-social support.
When a formal complaint is filed, the victim then follows a pathway sometimes experienced as burdensome or constraining, requiring multiple appointments where she must repeatedly recount what happened, undergo forensic examinations, and allow the seizure of items and objects for the purposes of a procedure, with sealed evidence forwarded to a forensic or hospital laboratory for medico-legal analysis. Otherwise, it is at least essential to ensure the preservation of the samples in the event of a later complaint or judicial referral.
Additional obstacles may include inadequate reception conditions or delays in the process. This causes stress for victims and their families, and some abandon their initial steps.
In this context, beginning in 2018, the National Gendarmerie developed the “MAEVAS” Program—Support and Examination Kit for Sexual Assault Victims—under the supervision of the National Gendarmerie’s Criminal Research Institute (IRCGN) in Pontoise (95).
Better supporting victims of sexual assault
“MAEVAS” offers an innovative, comprehensive approach designed to support victims of the most serious sexual offenses, regardless of age or gender, while providing collaborative methodological and forensic tools that enable all necessary investigations. These tools are grouped in a single kit, to facilitate the resolution of this category of offenses—from the reception of the victim filing a complaint, to the collection of forensic samples—aiming for optimum judicial processing while ensuring continuous support for the victim and her or his relatives throughout the investigation.
The aim is to avoid subjecting the victim to repeated interviews or subsequent supplementary procedures, which could be traumatizing. The body of a victim is not a crime scene like any other!
Indeed, the Medico-Judicial Units (Unité Médico-Judiciaire, UMJ)—where medical staff work in cooperation with the judicial authority, performing medical procedures at the request of investigators or the courts—are the structures best suited to respond effectively to this need. However, half of France is not provided with UMJs, which are often, if not exclusively, located in National Police jurisdictions where hospital emergency services are also available. The situation is very different in areas under the jurisdiction of the National Gendarmerie, particularly in overseas departments and territories.
Initially deployed within Gendarmerie units located far from an UMJ, “MAEVAS” will help reduce territorial inequalities and can be especially implemented in overseas territories.
Its availability in reception units should make it possible—where timely treatment in an UMJ is not feasible (due to distance, accessibility, etc.)—for a physician working in private practice, specifically requisitioned, to carry out the necessary forensic examinations in his or her office. This ensures that no victim is left without an appropriate response, which would otherwise undermine the recognition of the assault. The project is therefore based on close collaboration among all stakeholders, centered on the condition and support needs of every victim of such aggression.
In the future, “MAEVAS” may also be deployed in prisons or universities (hazing), and even in the sports environment. The concept could also be adapted for use within the Armed Forces (sexual assaults during overseas operations, aboard Navy vessels, on military bases, etc.) through the involvement of military physicians.
A complete forensic kit for investigators and physicians
The kit includes a summary document gathering multiple recommendations—from advice on how to welcome a victim, to forensic sampling procedures, and including aspects relating to interviews and victim support. In its initial version, a simplified content focusing primarily on suspect identification is proposed, allowing for faster initial deployment.
It also contains: – The necessary consumables, provided as pre-packaged kits, dedicated to various screenings and preliminary sampling (DNA, toxicology, trace evidence, hygiene kit, etc.), with the objective of identifying the perpetrator; – Guideline sheets to assist with sampling, as well as recommendations (health and forensic considerations, evidence location and preservation, etc.), for doctors and investigators, ensuring continuity of procedures and communication among all stakeholders.
“MAEVAS” can thus be deployed in units located far from Medico-Judicial Units (UMJ) and hospital services. It is the responsibility of these units to ensure that any victim reporting to their premises is supported with a “MAEVAS” kit.
Furthermore, given that Medico-Judicial Units (UMJs) and hospital emergency services wish to strengthen their contacts with investigators in order to improve coordination and operational actions, it may be envisaged in the future, in cooperation with the Ministry of Solidarity and Health, to provide them with “MAEVAS” kits.
The resolution of such cases requires complementary actions among stakeholders addressing both the condition and support needs of every victim of this type of assault. These actors often intervene one after the other, whereas a global, complementary, harmonized, and systematic approach would be less traumatic for the victim and allow investigators to make better use of the evidence. It is with this aim that on 13 March 2019 in Pontoise (95), a Gend’Lab(*) was organized on the theme: “Violence against women: the strengths of MAEVAS (Support and Examination Kit for Sexual Assault Victims).” The purpose of this Gend’Lab was to bring together all stakeholders able to contribute to the design and support of the kit, both upstream and downstream of its use (victim support associations, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Health, the Medical Council, etc.).
* : Événement ouvert au public organisé par la Gendarmerie Nationale qui a pour objet d’exposer ses travaux ou projets scientifiques et techniques en présence des partenaires du projet et des organisations intéressées par le thème.
With “MAEVAS,” each actor involved completes their share of the case file, resulting in a coherent judicial file that can be easily used by a magistrate.
A pilot project launched in the first half of 2022
The “MAEVAS” kit, combining both the forensic dimension (support for investigators) and the victim-assistance dimension (references to victim-support associations), has been the subject of a field trial since mid-2022 in the departments of Charente-Maritime (17), Cher (18), and Val-d’Oise (95), which have different medico-legal environments.
As for overseas specificities, the Overseas Gendarmerie Command and the Ministry of Overseas France proposed piloting the kit in Réunion, due to its insular nature and the significant volume of cases potentially concerned by “MAEVAS,” and in French Polynesia, due to its multiple insularities, relative isolation, and the difficulties that may arise in accessing appropriate medical and forensic care.
Improving the response to victims
Each kit is intended for a specific actor and action, accompanied by an adapted form. This will help automate and standardize forensic and investigative procedures. The kit’s composition must be standardized and traceable (e.g., expiration dates), with careful consideration given to the preservation of collected samples.
This initiative demonstrates that specialists can combine their efforts and share experiences, clarify roles and responsibilities, and avoid wasting time and expertise, all for the benefit of addressing victims’ situations. A fine-grained understanding of the phenomenon is indispensable, enabling the system to be adapted over time.
Victims must be able to trust the State’s response, as they fear for themselves or their relatives. They need to know that support is available to mitigate the family trauma. This is especially true since victims often fear not being listened to or believed when reporting the facts.
Dead bodies are a highly contested resource: some insects do not hesitate to travel kilometers to lay their eggs there. This necrophagous entomofauna is usually discreet but omnipresent: the slightest dead animal is immediately colonized. Even though human bodies are rare compared to other animals, they do not escape this fatal attraction.
As soon as death occurs, a body attracts new occupants: if the weather is good, flies arrive in just a few minutes. They lay hundreds of eggs, which hatch into just as many maggots. Under the effect of this rapid and massive colonization, the corpse becomes a true ecosystem. Forensic entomology analyzes the insects within this ecosystem in order to estimate the time and sometimes the circumstances of death. This type of expertise has deep roots (the first written records date back to the 13th century), but the methods have evolved considerably in recent years. At the end of the 19th century, a French veterinarian, J.P. Mégnin, proposed a chronology based on the succession of insects. This principle, known as the “theory of squads of carrion insects”, long served as a reference for dating corpses. It was gradually abandoned, however, because of its lack of precision and reliability. The squad method is therefore no longer used for judicial dating, which now relies instead on calculating the age of larvae.
Which insects colonize a corpse?
The most common and abundant species are flies from the family Calliphoridae. Females can detect a body from kilometers away and even enter houses. Each female lays a cluster of about 200 eggs, which hatch into small maggots. Despite their small size, these eggs and young larvae are relatively easy to spot: they are generally found around the face (eyes, nostrils, eyebrows), the scalp, at the interface with the ground, or in moist and protected areas (clothing). These blowfly larvae feed on the flesh for several days, then move away from the corpse to find a shelter where they transform into pupae (cocoons) inside which they metamorphose into adult flies. In addition to Calliphoridae, flies from the families Muscidae, Faniidae and Sarcophagidae also colonize corpses, though at a later stage. Their biology allows them to develop and reproduce on the same corpse for several generations. Some species can even penetrate confined spaces such as coffins, where they are observed in abundance during exhumations.
Throughout decomposition, beetles from the families Necrophoridae, Histeridae and Staphylinidae may also be found. Apart from some common species such as Necrodes littoralis or Creophilus maxilosus, these insects are relatively poorly understood and therefore provide little information for dating death. One exception are dermestid beetles (literally “skin eaters”), small beetles that feed on dried flesh. Dermestids are common in warm and dry climates as well as in corpses found indoors, where they can quickly proliferate and lead to rapid skeletonization. Their molts and droppings are then found in abundance, forming a kind of fibrous soil (called “frass”). Such traces can provide a reliable estimate of the post-mortem interval, even several months after death.
Finally, there is also a multitude of opportunistic or occasional species that take advantage of the presence of a corpse in their environment to feed or hunt. These include moths, wasps, ants, spiders, dung beetles, and other more or less accidental species. While they should not be ruled out in principle, they often provide little information. In fact, the vast majority of forensic entomology expertise is based on the analysis of fly larvae, mainly Calliphoridae.
The Role of Forensic Entomology Expertise
The use of insects becomes essential when classical forensic dating techniques are no longer effective—that is, 48 to 72 hours after death. The first step in entomological expertise consists of collecting the insects found on and around the body, and then identifying them. Sampling must be performed by a properly trained individual, most often a crime scene technician (forensic police) or a forensic pathologist. Recommendations have been published by the European Association for Forensic Entomology (EAFE), and many reference works provide sampling protocols. Some laboratories or equipment suppliers also distribute kits containing the necessary material along with a protocol. Below are some basic principles:
• Samples must be collected at the site where the body was discovered. All insects on or in the immediate vicinity of the body should be collected: larvae, worms, beetles, dead flies, etc. The goal is to obtain a representative sample. It is not necessary to capture flies flying around the corpse. Additional samples can be collected during the autopsy if needed.
• Remember to look for pupae (cocoons), which are generally located at some distance from the corpse. If the body is outdoors, collect soil around the body (1–2 meters away, a few centimeters deep). If indoors, check under objects in the room and in adjacent rooms.
• Place living insects in vials with small perforations (ensuring they cannot escape). Preserve half of the collected specimens by immersing them in a fixative solution (formalin or alcohol) or by freezing them. Label each vial with the date and time, and briefly describe its contents (e.g., “2 larvae” or “1 empty pupa”).
• Store samples in a cool environmentas quickly as possible and submit them for analysis without delay (within a few days at most). Record the thermal history (e.g., “sampled on 25/07 at 16:00, refrigerated at 7 °C at 17:00, transported on 27/07 at 10:00”).• Any information not appearing in the body discovery report or the photographic documentation should be communicated to the forensic entomologist.
Estimating the age of larvae colonizing human remains
The fundamental principle of forensic entomology is to calculate the age of larvae or pupae in order to determine the timing of oviposition. Since necrophagous insects are involved, their presence indicates that the victim was already deceased at the time of colonization. For instance, if a body is discovered on May 28 and necrophagous insects aged 10 days are found on the remains, this means the victim had already been dead for 10 days prior to discovery, i.e., since May 18. This is referred to as the minimum postmortem interval.
To estimate larval age, it is necessary to identify the species and determine the temperature. The most widely used method is known as degree-days. To illustrate how it works, let us consider an example. Assume that the species collected from the body has a developmental threshold temperature, denoted Ts, of 10°C. This Ts value may be regarded as a fixed tax: only the degrees above this threshold contribute to larval development. At a constant temperature of 20°C, each day provides this species with 20°C – Ts = 10 degree-days for development. At 30°C, the larva accumulates 30 – Ts = 20 degree-days. The developmental target to reach is referred to as ADD (Accumulated Degree Days). In our example, let us suppose that 150 ADD are required for an egg of this species to reach the adult stage. At a constant temperature of 20°C, each day provides 10 degree-days, meaning that 15 days are needed to accumulate 150 ADD and obtain an adult fly. The same reasoning applies when temperature fluctuates: one day at 20°C followed by a day at 30°C provides 10 + 20 = 30 degree-days for the maggot.
This method has the advantage of being straightforward and applicable in both directions: one can observe a larva and determine when it will reach adulthood, or conversely start from the adult stage to reconstruct the duration of its larval development. This is precisely what is done in forensic investigations: the larvae found on the cadaver are identified, ambient temperatures are reconstructed, and from this the length of time the larvae have been developing on the remains is established, corresponding to the minimum postmortem interval.
How to estimate the colonization interval ?
Calculating the minimum postmortem interval is generally not sufficient. Returning to our previous example: in a case where a victim has been missing since December, stating that they had been dead for 10 days before the discovery of the body, i.e., since May 18, would not be of much practical use. The forensic entomologist’s task is therefore not only to determine the age of the larvae, but also to estimate the delay between death and the arrival of insects. When developing larvae of Calliphoridae flies are recovered, interpretation is relatively straightforward: under favorable conditions, these flies oviposit very shortly after death. The date of initial oviposition can thus be considered concomitant with the time of death.
By contrast, when colonization conditions are not optimal (adverse weather conditions, body located indoors) or in the case of so-called late-arriving species, it becomes more challenging, and sometimes impossible, to calculate the time elapsed between death and oviposition. In such situations, dating is therefore limited to establishing a minimum postmortem interval, sometimes supplemented with a qualitative estimate of the colonization delay.
Other contributions and limitations of forensic entomology
Beyond estimating the time of death, the study of the entomofauna associated with a corpse can shed light on events that occurred peri- or postmortem. The absence of a set of very common species on a body may indicate a temporary inaccessibility of the remains. This may result from confinement (e.g., sequestration of the body in a closed room), wrapping of the body, or unfavorable weather conditions. Conversely, it is often suggested that the presence of certain species could indicate the relocation of a body. This notion is largely unrealistic: the main necrophagous species are found throughout Central Europe and in almost all environments. It is therefore exceptional to encounter a species that serves as a specific geographic indicator. Two particular cases should nonetheless be mentioned: buried bodies, which are generally only minimally colonized, and submerged bodies, which are associated with a distinct fauna. Finally, necrophagous insects may sometimes colonize necrotic wounds in living individuals, a phenomenon referred to as myiasis. In such cases, larval analysis can provide information on the timing of the last medical care and help demonstrate potential neglect or abuse of a dependent person.
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